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ABSTRACT 
 
The returns and portfolio characteristics of core funds were tested for evidence of herd behavior 
and performance relative to the NCREIF Property Index (NPI), using a proprietary database that 
included data from 1985 to 2004.  Tests performed include descriptive statistics, regression 
analysis, and attribution analysis. 
 
Results indicate that herd behavior tends to be somewhat correlated with the NPI return.  
Through our disaggregate (fund specific) analysis, we find that herd behavior, where managers 
base investment decisions on the collective actions of the market rather than their individual 
beliefs, may be present in the core fund industry.  Regression analysis suggests that herding 
appears to be positively correlated with fund size and negatively correlated to leverage, fees, and 
persistence from the one-year lag of the deviation from the mean. 
 
Performance analysis results indicate that although fund leverage has increased significantly over 
time, the use of debt has produced little or no additional return to investors.  We found that 
across funds, net returns to real estate fall short of the NPI, and that across time, there is a 
negative correlation between the performance of the index and fund performance relative to the 
index.  Attribution analysis revealed that property selection returns have produced the greatest 
amount of return deviation from the NPI over time, and that selection and strategy returns are 
negatively correlated.  Regression analysis suggests there is persistence in fund performance in 
the short term, that a fund’s fee is positively correlated with gross returns, although that does not 
necessarily translate into higher returns to the investor, and that larger funds are negatively 
correlated with performance. 
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I. Introduction 
The real estate private equity industry has grown tremendously over the last decade as a result of 
both regulatory and market changes.  As real estate has gained favor as an asset class, comprising 
a larger portion of and occupying a more permanent place in a balanced portfolio, real estate core 
funds have become a popular investment vehicle.  This relatively recent interest in core funds has 
brought into focus a number of issues in this segment of the real estate industry with regard to 
reporting practices, transparency of results and, perhaps most importantly, individual manager 
performance. 
From a cursory review of the data available, returns of core funds appear tightly bunched 
over the long term, and fall relatively close to the National Council of Real Estate Investment 
Fiduciaries (NCREIF) benchmark index, suggesting that core funds are something of a 
commodity; but do these casual observations stand up to rigorous analysis?  In an attempt to 
answer this question, our study focuses on two issues:  i) characterizing herd behavior in the core 
real estate fund industry and ii) determining whether there is an advantage to investing in one 
particular core fund over another. 
We begin our analysis with herd behavior, examining both the aggregate and 
disaggregate dispersion in total returns and testing for possible correlates, including fund size, 
leverage, fee, and age.  We then analyze the performance of core funds by comparing the subject 
group to the NCREIF Property Index (NPI), examining both gross-of-fee and net-of-fee returns 
on an aggregate and disaggregate basis.  Lastly, we investigate the individual investment 
selection and allocation strategy performance of each fund to help identify the reasons for over- 
or under-performance. 
 6
II. Overview of Core Funds 
With the disastrous effects of the 2000 to 2002 bear market in publicly-traded equities, 
institutional investors are making increasingly greater commitments to real estate in search for 
stability, higher cash income and the potential for significant total return.1  As a result, almost all 
general investment consultants are gearing up their search activity and ability to deal in private 
real estate, an asset class that many had ignored in the 1990’s.2  In a recently reported 2005 
Pension Real Estate Association (PREA) Plan Sponsor Survey, just over one-third of the plans 
report they have a target allocation to real estate of 10% or more.  Although these allocation 
targets are high relative to historical standards, actual investment falls below the mark.  Only 
12.3% of plans surveyed actually hold 10% or more of their total assets in real estate.3 
In an effort to define investor objectives, and to direct advisors’ efforts in acquisitions 
and asset management, a consensus has emerged around the terms “core,” “enhanced core or 
core-plus,” “value-added” and “opportunistic.”  “Core” comprises the bulk of most investors’ 
real estate portfolios, and has traditionally involved investments in well leased, multi-tenanted 
properties in major metropolitan areas, owned with little or no mortgage debt and made up of 
mainstream, income-producing office, industrial, retail and multi-family assets.  As reported in 
the 2005 PREA Plan Sponsor Survey, investments classified as core constitute 70.4%, or $73 
billion of the $104 billion currently invested in institutional quality real estate.4 
Generally speaking, core properties are viewed as the least risky, commensurately 
producing the lowest returns.  Some consultants use absolute return targets to help define the 
difference in investment types, with core returning 8-10%, core-plus delivering 10-12%, value-
added stepping-up another 200 basis points to 12-14%, and opportunistic investments yielding 
14% or higher.  Others simply use a relative yardstick, such as the NPI return plus 100, 200 or 
400 basis points.5 
                                                 
1 Ronald W. Kaiser, “Investment Styles and Style Bosex in Equity Real Estate: Can the Emerging Model Succeed in 
Classifying Real Estate Alternatives?,” Journal of Real Estate Portfolio Management, vol. 11, no. 1 (Jan-Apr 2005), 
p. 5 
2 Ibid., p. 6 
3 “2005 Plan Sponsor Research Report,” Pension Real Estate Association, 2005, p. 6 
4 Ibid., p. 11 
5 Ronald W. Kaiser, “Investment Styles and Style Bosex in Equity Real Estate: Can the Emerging Model Succeed in 
Classifying Real Estate Alternatives?,” Journal of Real Estate Portfolio Management, vol. 11, no. 1 (Jan-Apr 2005), 
p. 10 
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Figure 1:  Real Estate Assets By Investment Class and Fund Size 
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III. Literature Review 
Herd Behavior 
Literature on herd behavior has mainly focused on the financial stock markets.  Although real 
estate core funds have been part of the institutional investment sector since the 1990’s, there has 
not been a thorough investigation of potential herd behavior between these funds and NCREIF.  
This is likely due to the fact that, unlike information on publicly traded companies, data on core 
funds is not publicly available. 
Christie and Huang (1995) provide this description of Herd Behavior: “In a market 
setting, herds are characterized by individuals who suppress their own beliefs and base their 
investment decisions solely on the collective actions of the market, even when they disagree with 
its predictions.”6  Their objective was to test for the presence of herd behavior when herds are 
most likely to form in financial markets.  They believed that because individuals are more likely 
to suppress their own beliefs in favor of the market consensus during periods of unusual market 
movements, herd behavior would most likely emerge during periods of market stress.  Natural 
candidates for these periods are those trading intervals characterized by large swings in average 
prices.  Additionally, they believed that firms herd around the returns of firms that share 
common characteristics.  For example in our study, core real estate funds herding around similar 
core real estate funds.  Results of their study indicated that dispersions increase much more 
dramatically during up markets relative to down markets.  They also found that the dispersions 
were found to increase significantly during periods of large average price changes, implying 
individual returns do not cluster around either the market or industry returns during periods of 
market stress. 
Christie and Huang also tested for herding within industries, using data from both NYSE 
and AMEX firms for a period extending from July 1962 and December 1988.  Daily and 
monthly returns were equally weighted.  The following table provides the average level of 
dispersions, its associated standard deviation, and the average number of firms used to compute 
the statistics for the entire sample and by industry.  For the daily returns, the average level of 
                                                 
6 William G. Christie and Roger D. Huang, “Following the Pied Piper: Do Individual Returns Herd around the 
Market?,” Financial Analysts Journal, vol. 51, no. 4 (July-August 1995), p. 31 
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dispersion is 2.90% a day across all stocks, with a standard deviation of .59%.  Across industries, 
the level of dispersion ranges from a low of 1.60% for utilities to 3.24% for petroleum.  The 
average level of dispersion for monthly returns is 9.77% with a standard deviation of 5.22%.  
Instead of Christie and Huang’s daily and monthly returns, our dispersion analysis uses 
annualized returns. 
 
Source: Christie and Huang 1995 
Figure 2:  Return Dispersion By Industry 
Bikhchandani and Sharma (2001) describe herding a result from an obvious intent by 
investors to copy the behavior of other investors. 7  If a manager is uncertain, they follow the 
“noise” of the market.  The paper also describes compensation-based herding where, if an 
investment manager’s compensation depends on how the performance compares with other 
professionals, this may lead to herd behavior.8 Additionally, Scharfstein and Stein (1990) find 
that under certain circumstances, managers simply mimic the investment decisions of other 
managers, ignoring substantive private information.  Herd behavior by money managers could 
                                                 
7 Sushil Bikhchandani and Sunil Sharma, “Herd Behavior in Financial Markets,” International Monetary Fund Staff 
Papers,” vol. 47, no. 3 (2001) p. 281 
8 Ibid.,  p. 292 
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provide a partial explanation for excessive stock market volatility.  By mimicking the behavior 
of others rather than responding to their private information, members of a herd will tend to 
amplify exogenous stock price shocks.9 
Real Estate Fund Performance 
Most of the existing literature on real estate performance focuses on publicly-traded REITS and 
mutual funds.  Our research found no published articles specifically addressing return 
performance within the core fund industry, again, likely due to the proprietary nature of the 
information. 
Gallo, Lockwood and Rutherford (2000) examined the performance of real estate mutual 
funds from January 1991 to December 1997 and found that their sample of funds outperformed 
the Wilshire Real Estate Securities Index on a risk-adjusted basis by more than 5% annually.  
They attribute this superior performance to funds’ over-weighting outperforming property types 
(specifically health care and apartments) relative to the index, concluding that the funds 
employed superior allocation strategies among asset classes during the study period, but that 
selection within a property type had no effect on returns. 
Damodaran and Liu (1993) and Kallberg, Liu and Trzcinka (2000) suggest that 
investment managers in real estate can produce positive abnormal returns because of their 
specific appraisal skills and information about real estate investment targets, while 
acknowledging that existing studies on professionally managed real estate investments have not 
found evidence of positive abnormal performance. 
On the other hand, O’Neal and Page (2000) examined the performance of twenty-eight 
real estate mutual funds over a three-year period from 1996 to 1998, concluding that they did not 
produce positive abnormal returns. 
Lin and Yung (2004) corroborate that finding, concluding that mutual fund performance 
is primarily determined by the performance of the real estate sector as a whole.  Their study also 
found that fund performance persists in the short term, and that risk adjusted real estate fund 
returns are positively affected by fund size, but are unrelated to expense ratio, management 
tenure and turnover. 
                                                 
9 David S. Scharfstein and Jeremy C. Stein, “Herd Behavior and Investment,” The American Economic Review,” 
vol. 80, no. 3 (June 1990) p. 477 
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Myer and Webb (1993) regressed quarterly holding period returns of professionally 
managed private real estate portfolios onto the NPI for a period of 29 quarters.  In the 47 
portfolios they examined, they found only 16 (or 34%) whose returns exceeded the NPI with 
statistical significance. 
In a later study, Myer, Webb and He (1997) expanded their research to include the effect 
of a fund’s asset management fee on return and to test for persistence.  They conclude that the 
ranking of funds does not seem to depend on whether gross or net returns are used, suggesting 
that funds with superior performance do not charge fees that are higher, on average, than those 
charged by poorly performing funds. They also found that a far larger percentage of funds 
outperform NCREIF when a Jensen alpha measure (a risk-adjusted return metric) is used 
compared to a cumulative return measure. The evidence for persistence of performance also 
differs by performance measure.  The cumulative return showed some evidence of persistence, 
but the Jensen alpha measure did not. 
It is important to keep in mind that these conclusions were reached studying funds that 
invested in publicly traded real estate securities and not individual property investments.  In 
principle, real estate investment managers who buy property directly might be able to produce 
persistently superior selection effect returns (gross-of-fees, anyway) without violating market 
efficiency assumptions due to: (i) the private nature of the asset market, which might enable 
some managers to gain “inside” access to the best deals (known in the venture capital investment 
industry as “deal flow access” – i.e., they get to see the best deals first, presumably because of a 
track record of reliable and speedy execution of the deal), and (ii) the ability of the investment 
manager to exercise operational control over the investment assets (unlike in the case of stock 
mutual fund managers), which could enable managers with non-replicatable property value-
enhancing operational management skills to perform better than average.10 
Portfolio-Level Attribution Analysis 
Geltner and Miller (2001) describe selection and allocation as the two major functions of a 
portfolio manager, and consequently, portfolio level performance attribution seeks to parse the 
                                                 
10 That said, these micro-level effects would be more difficult to produce for the commodity-like investments of core 
funds than for the more entrepreneurial investments of opportunity funds.  It would seem more likely that core 
managers might have superior macro-level research that could enable persistently superior sector allocation strategy 
to effect performance. 
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total return performance relative to the benchmark into two components relating to these two 
functions.  Selection is defined as the micro-level decision of which particular assets are picked 
by the manager to include in the portfolio, and allocation refers to the chosen segment weights in 
a portfolio, which in the case of our study is property type.  We employ standard industry 
methodology, the mechanics of which are outlined in the next section, to quantify performance 
attributes and evaluate the performance of our study group of funds relative to the NPI. 
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IV. Data  
Data used in this study was provided by Pension Consulting Alliance, Inc. (PCA), a consultancy 
organization which, in addition to providing advisory services for pension funds, conducts 
research and reporting on investment topics.11  Data was gathered from core fund general 
partners through questionnaires and annual reports since their respective inception to year-end 
2004.  Only commingled, open-ended funds are included in our study, as defined by Pension 
Real Estate Association (PREA): 
Commingled fund: a term applied to all open-end and closed-end pooled 
investment vehicles designed for institutional tax-exempt investors.  A 
commingled fund may be organized as a group trust, a partnership, a corporation, 
an insurance company separate account, or another multiple ownership entity.12 
Open-end fund: a commingled fund with no finite life that allows continuous 
entry and exit of investors and typically engages in ongoing investment purchase 
and sale activities. 13 
A total of thirteen firms representing nineteen open-ended funds participated in the initial survey. 
The data set for herd behavior analysis consists of ten firms with thirteen funds reporting 
from 1985 through 2004.  A total of six funds were eliminated for the following reasons: three 
were recently formed in the second or third quarter of 2004 and had not yet accumulated a full 
year’s worth of performance data, another two specialized in only one property type, and one 
exhibited characteristics more similar to opportunistic funds than core real estate. 
The data set for the performance analysis consists of nine firms with eleven funds 
reporting both fund characteristics and performance results from 1985 to 2004.  In addition to the 
above mentioned funds that were eliminated from the data set, another two were removed 
because of higher yield targets and investment styles more indicative of “value-add” funds than 
“core” funds. 
The firms provided the following information: 
                                                 
11 Pension Consulting Alliance website: http://www.pensionconsulting.com 
12 “2005 Plan Sponsor Research Report,” Pension Real Estate Association, 2005, p. 31 
13 Ibid, p. 31 
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• Quarterly income, appreciation and total returns- both gross and net of all management 
fees, other fees and expenses for each quarter since inception 
• Quarterly Gross and Net Asset Value for each quarter since inception 
• Year-end disaggregation of the value of property holdings (based on GAV) by the five 
major property types (i.e.: Office, Apartment, Retail, Industrial and Hotel) and the four 
major geographic regions (East, West, South, Midwest) for each year since inception 
• Year-end total number of properties held in the fund broken down into the five major 
property types and four major geographic regions for each year since inception 
The study also includes data from NCREIF as a benchmark for core funds.  Nearly all plan 
sponsors surveyed in the 2005 PREA survey benchmark their real estate investments using 
NCREIF’s data.   
 
Source: Pension Real Estate Association 
Figure 3:  NCREIF is Benchmark of Choice for Pension Funds 
The study specifically utilized NCREIF’s newest performance product, the NCREIF Fund Index-
Open-End Diversified Core Equity or NFI-ODCE.  The NFI-ODCE is an index of investment 
returns reporting on both a historical and current basis the results of 26 open-end commingled 
funds pursuing a core investment strategy, some of which have performance histories dating 
back to the 1970’s.   
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V. Herd Behavior 
Methodology 
We first investigated herd behavior at the aggregate level (across all of the funds) within each 
year, to observe how herd behavior has been varying over time.  Then we go down to the 
disaggregate level where we model the herd behavior of individual funds, also over time.  Our 
quantitative measure of herd behavior is labeled as “D(t)” for the disaggregate measure for fund i 
in year t.  We use the label “D” to stand for dispersion or deviation, the amount of difference 
among funds from the mean performance of all the funds (in a given year).  Thus, “D(t)” is 
actually a measure of the inverse of herd behavior.  The larger “D(t)” is, the less “herd behavior” 
there is, as “D(t)” is actually a measure of “deviation from the herd”, where “herd” is defined as 
the mean performance of all of the funds. 
“D(t)" is defined in two alternative ways, both measuring the absolute (unsigned) 
difference from the mean across all funds in each year.  Thus, our measure of deviation is not 
sensitive to whether a fund deviates from the mean by performing better than the mean or worse 
than the mean.  (The signed or algebraic difference would measure the relative quality of 
performance, which is a different topic than herding, and is studied in the other part of this thesis 
using different measures.)  The two definitions of “D” that we use are based on, respectively, the 
absolute deviation and the squared deviation from the mean fund performance each year.  For 
aggregate level analysis, we use the average of these measures across the funds available each 
year. 
• The mean absolute deviation (MAD) is the difference each period between the total 
return performance of each fund and the unweighted mean total return performance of all 
the funds, averaged across all the funds: 
D(t)=∑ |(r(i,t)-r(m,t)) |  (Equation 1) 
          n(t) 
where r(i,t) is the total return to fund i in year t, r(m,t) is the mean total return to all of the funds 
in year t, and n(t) is the number of funds available in year t.  The sum is across funds within each 
year.   
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• The mean squared deviation (MSD) is similar, but only takes the square rather than the 
absolute value of the deviations, across the funds, within each year: 
D(t) = ∑  ((r(i,t)-r(m,t))2   (Equation 2)  
        (n(t)-1) 
As noted, we also analyze the disaggregate (fund specific) herd behavior over time.  This is 
calculated based on a disaggregated measure of fund deviation from the mean fund each year 
“D(i,t)”: 
D(i,t) = (r(i,t) - r(m,t))2      (Equation 3) 
The equation shows the magnitude of the dispersion between funds, across time. 
Lastly, the study also uses a regression analysis on the pooled (panel) data, regressing our 
disaggregate measure of dispersion, “D(i,t)” on to several different combinations of 
“explanatory” variables, to test some hypotheses about what might be causing or correlated to 
herd behavior.  These regressions are across both time and funds where both “i” and “t” will be 
varying in the data. 
Results and Analysis 
We begin our characterization of herd behavior at the aggregate level with an analysis of 
performance dispersion, across all funds within each year.  Graph 1 plots the square root of the 
MSD (i.e., the “standard deviation” of the funds’ performance) in each year in our sample 
history, to show how herd behavior has been changing over time.   
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Graph 1: NCREIF vs. Standard Deviation of the Mean (across all funds) 
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Looking at the above graph, D(t) ranges from 1% in 1996 to 9% in 1992, with most years 
ranging from 2%-3%.  Other than the outlier year of 1992, we found that herd behavior tended to 
be somewhat correlated with the NCREIF return.  When NCREIF was in an upmarket, there was 
less herding across funds.  Whereas in a down-market, herding was more apparent.  1992 was a 
somewhat anomalous year when private real estate markets bottomed, the turning point when 
companies initiated the REIT boom, the CMBS market was just forming, and allegations that 
some funds were overvalued.   
Graph 2 is like Graph 1 only it uses the MAD rather than the MSD to portray the average 
fund return performance deviation from the mean by year. 
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Graph 2:Mean Absolute Deviation 
Graph 2 shows a very similar picture to Graph 1 except that the deviation range is slightly 
smaller, from 1% in 1996 and nearly 8% in 1992, with most of the years ranging from 1.5%-3%. 
Next we turn to our disaggregate analysis.  To begin, let us look at scatterplots of the 
individual fund returns relative to the mean return each year.  Each “dot” (triangle) in the 
scatterplots presented in Graphs 3-5 represent one fund’s performance relative to the mean 
during this year indicated on the horizontal axis: (r(i,t)-r(m,t)).  Graphs 3, 4, and 5 show, 
respectively, the deviation for 1-yr, and for trailing annualized average 3-year and 5-year returns.  
The solid line is the corresponding (trailing average) NCREIF return, to illustrate the prevailing 
institutional real estate market condition.  Funds are masked for anonymity.  
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Fund Specific Deviation: 1-Yr Returns
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Graph 3: Fund Specific Deviation: 1-Year Returns 
Graph 3 does not strike one visually as indicating much herding behavior at the annual 
frequency.  This is in some contrast to Graph 4 and 5, which show much less dispersion (note the 
change in vertical axis scales).  The reduction in dispersion between the 1-year and the 3 and 5-
year returns is mostly the effect of annualizing the multiple year returns.   
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Graph 4: Fund Specific Deviation: 3-Year Returns 
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At the 3-year frequency shown above, the dispersion ranges from -6% to 7%, with the majority 
of funds hovering between the +/- 2% mark.  It worth noting that in the recent years, the funds 
have been increasingly herding toward the mean.   
Fund Specific Deviation: 5-Yr Returns
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Graph 5: Fund Specific Deviation: 5-Year Returns 
The 5-year return deviation chart above further suggests herding behavior.  The deviations are 
now more closely bunched together, especially from 2001 to the year-end 2004.  They range 
from -4% to +5%, with the majority clustering between the -2% to +1% range, which is more 
tightly bunched than the 3-year deviations.  In summary, the scatterplots suggest herding once 
the returns are averaged over multiple years. 
Structural Analysis of Herding Behavior  
A regression analysis was performed to see if we could gain an understanding of the 
determinates or correlates of herd behavior.  The study regressed our squared deviation 
disaggregate dispersion measure “D(i,t)” onto several different combinations of fund 
characteristics available in our data and that could serve as “explanatory” variables for fund 
dispersion from the mean.   
The formula being estimated takes the form: 
 20
D(i,t) = α + ß1SIZE(i,t) + ß2AGE(i,t) + ß3LEVERAGE(i,t) + ß4FEE(i,t) + ß5UPMKT(i,t) + 
ß6DWNMKT(i,t) + ß7 D(i,t-1)  (Equation 4) 
The variable “SIZE” represents the fund’s size (in dollars) or Gross Asset Value.  A 
larger size of fund may have a greater number of real estate assets in its portfolio which limits 
the fund from trying to make strategic decisions to beat the benchmark.  In other words, as the 
fund increases in size, it is more difficult to make an impact on total return of the fund that beats 
the benchmark.  Therefore, we might be able to expect a negative relationship between the 
“SIZE” and our measure of dispersion.   
The variable “AGE” represents the number of years since the inception of the fund.  The 
older the fund is may result in management expertise that has identified a strategy, through trial 
and error, that can exceed the benchmark.  So we might expect a positive relationship between 
“AGE” and our measure of dispersion. 
The variable “LEVERAGE” represents the Loan-to-Value ratio of the fund; the percent 
debt calculated at year end: GAV-NAV/GAV.  A larger leverage percentage might reflect a 
strategy that the fund may achiever higher return as they increase the amount of debt in their 
portfolio.  Therefore, we may be able to expect a positive relationship between “LEVERAGE” 
and our measure of dispersion.   
The variable “FEE” equals the difference between fund gross and net returns.  A larger 
fee might reflect greater resources available to the fund to conduct research and strategy, to 
attempt to beat the benchmark by differentiating its strategy from the benchmark.  So we might 
expect a positive relationship between the “FEE” and our measure of dispersion. 
The variable “UPMKT” represents the time dummies for the growth in NCREIF’s market 
condition.  Inferring from the Christie and Huang article that stocks usually tend to increase 
dispersions during up markets, we might expect a positive relationship between “UPMKT” and 
our measure of dispersion. 
The variable “DWNMKT,” on the other hand, represents the time dummies for the drop 
in NCREIF’s market condition.  Again inferring from the Christie and Huang article that stocks 
herd behavior would most likely emerge during periods of market stress, we might expect a 
negative relationship between “DWNMKT “and our measure of dispersion. 
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The variable “D(i,t-1)” is the one year lag of “D(i,t).”  Looking at NCREIF’s historical 
returns, there seems to be positive momentum from the previous year.  Since the mean of our 
sample is similar to the NCREIF returns, we can also probably expect a positive relationship 
between “D(i,t-1)” and our measure of dispersion. 
Table 1 presents the regression results when all of the possible explanatory variables 
available in our data are used.  Regressing equation 4, the analysis came up with the following 
statistics: 
Regression Statistics    
R2 0.126837   
Adjusted R2 0.075475   
 Coefficient t-stat p-stat 
Intercept -.0000490 -0.037909 0.969824
Fund Size -.0000003 -1.781861 0.077322
Fund Age .0000247 0.814416 0.417033
Fund Leverage .0048516 1.772797 0.078821
Fee .0307060 0.302626 0.762703
NCREIF upmkt .0004158 0.738867 0.461443
NCREIF dwnmkt .0003090 1.184375 0.238625
D(i,t-1) .2008032 2.187770 0.030641
Table 1: Regression Statistics 
The first thing we note in Table 1 is that this regression has a fairly low R-square 
measure of goodness of fit.  In other words, the set of structural explanatory variables tested here 
do not explain much of the variation in herd behavior.  However, it is not too surprising that we 
would get a rather small R-square in this type of model, because, there is relatively little range in 
these funds’ characteristics, our explanatory variables.  It is difficult for the regression model to 
predict fund dispersion when the predictors do not change much across funds or across time.14 
In other words, the funds are executing almost identical strategies which cause herding, 
and, as a result, tend to deviate from the mean by similar amounts. 
                                                 
14 The mean and standard deviation were calculated across the explanatory variables to give us an indication if the 
predictors do or do not change much across funds and time.  Although “SIZE” (mean: $2,021mm, stdev: $1,857mm) 
has a  lower standard deviation than the mean, there is still some predictive power in this specific variable.  “AGE” 
(mean: 15 years, stdev: 9 years), also has a lower standard deviation than the mean which explains the low 
predictive power of this variable.  “LEVERAGE” (mean 14.5%, stdev: 12.2%) has a lower standard deviation than 
the mean, however, there is still some predictive power in this variable.  “FEE” (mean 1.2%, stdev: 0.3%) has a 
standard deviation, which is lower than the mean, that indicates that the data sample is closely bunched together in 
term of “FEE.”  “D(i,t-1)” (mean: 0.1%, stdev: 0.3%) has a standard deviation, which is higher than the mean, that 
indicates that the variable has some predictive power. 
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Even though the R-squared is low, the regression analysis does find some predictive 
power in a few of the explanatory variables. The most significant predictors of fund dispersion 
from the mean are Fund Size, Fund Leverage, and the one-yr lag of the deviation.   
Table 1 reveals that the variable “SIZE” is significantly related to herding behavior.  This 
negative relationship is consistent to what we had expected; as the fund increases in size, the less 
the fund deviates from the mean performance of all the funds. 
Table 1 also reveals that the variable “AGE” is not significantly related to herd behavior.  
Even though an older fund may have more experience in the core fund industry, we do not find 
any evidence that this can lead a fund to deviate more from the mean performance of all the 
funds.    
It also reveals that the variable “LEVERAGE” is significantly related to herd behavior.  
This validates our expectation of a positive relationship between “LEVERAGE” and our 
measure of dispersion. We find evidence that as funds increase their debt percentage, the more 
the funds deviate from the mean performance of all the funds. 
Additionally, Table I reveals that “FEE” is not significantly related to herding behavior.  
Whatever higher fees are used for, we do not find any evidence that they lead a fund to deviate 
more from the mean performance of all the funds. 
The table also revealed that “UPMKT” is not significantly related to herding behavior. 
We do not find that the positive NCREIF market condition leads to a fund to deviate more from 
the mean performance of all the funds. 
It also revealed that “DWNMKT” is not significantly related to herding behavior. We do 
not find that the negative NCREIF market condition leads to a fund to deviate more from the 
mean performance of all the funds. 
Lastly, Table 1 reveals that “D(i,t-1)” is significantly related to herding behavior.  The 
one-year lag of dispersion exhibits positive momentum or persistence for a fund’s dispersion 
from the mean. 
A more parsimonious regression that only had the significant “explanatory” variables was also 
performed.  We regressed the squared deviation disaggregate dispersion measure “D(i,t)” onto 
“SIZE,” “LEVERAGE,” and “D(i,t-1).”  Table 2 presents the regression results when all the 
significant explanatory variables in our data are used: 
Regression Statistics    
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R2 0.110824066   
Adjusted R2 0.089136848   
 Coefficient t-stat p-stat 
Intercept 0.000992092 2.288618948 0.023807695
Fund Size (GAV) -2.39251E-07 -1.747939996 0.082969728
Fund Leverage 0.004449131 2.110436338 0.036846341
D(i,t-1) 0.223605094 2.510460411 0.013355282
Table 2: Regression Statistics-significant explanatory variables 
The first thing we note in Table 2 is that the regression has an even lower R-square measure of 
goodness of fit than Table 1.  However the parsimonious model has a higher adjusted R-square, 
and each of the explanatory variables increased in their predictive power. 
Fixed Effect Model 
While a purely structural model as discussed above presents an important perspective, additional 
insight may be gained by adding so-called “fixed effects” to the model.  Here we include dummy 
variables for fund identity and for the year of performance.  These dummy variables control for 
effects that are “residual” in each firm or in each year, leaving the coefficients on the structural 
variables to reflect only more fundamental and abiding effects of these underlying characteristics 
beyond what is conveyed by differences in firms or time.  One can also view the fixed effects 
regression as capturing the effect of omitted structural variables that differ between funds or 
across time.   
To perform the fixed effects regression, dummy variables were created for each fund 
which is called “fund fixed effect.”  Dummy variables were also created for each year which is 
called “time fixed effect.”  The original structural variables were also included (Equation 4), only 
with the constant dropped as it is duplicated by the fixed effects.  The fixed effects regression 
was run with both fixed effects, only the time effects, and only the firm effects.  
Regression Statistics    
R2 0.5427   
Adjusted R2 0.3547   
 Coefficient t-stat p-stat 
Fund Size  1.52 e-07 0.42 0.676 
Fund Age -.0000339 -0.31 0.754 
Fund Leverage .0021678 0.45 0.654 
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Fee .2755184 1.54 0.126 
NCREIF upmkt -.0023384 -0.85 0.397 
NCREIF dwnmkt -.0003472 -0.85 0.400 
D(i,t-1) .1303059 1.23 0.223 
Table 3: Regression Statistics-Firm and Time Fixed Effects 
 
Regression Statistics    
R2 0.4880   
Adjusted R2 0.3562   
 Coefficient t-stat p-stat 
Fund Size  -1.74 e-07 -1.14 0.257 
Fund Age .0000182 0.62 0.536 
Fund Leverage .0049037 1.43 0.155 
Fee .0980096 0.86 0.389 
NCREIF upmkt -.0011071 -0.58 0.562 
NCREIF dwnmkt -.0003982 -1.02 0.312 
D(i,t-1) .2572132 2.65 0.009 
Table 4: Regression Statistics-Time Fixed Effects 
 
Regression Statistics    
R2 0.3898   
Adjusted R2 0.2757   
 Coefficient t-stat p-stat 
Fund Size -1.31 e-07 -0.43 0.668 
Fund Age -.0000279 -0.39 0.694 
Fund Leverage .0013891 0.29 0.772 
Fee .2875926 1.62 0.109 
NCREIF upmkt .0004112 0.74 0.463 
NCREIF dwnmkt .0004164 1.54 0.126 
D(i,t-1) .0720821 0.74 0.459 
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Table 5: Regression Statistics-Firm Fixed Effects 
Not surprisingly, including fixed effects greatly improves the fit of the regression (R-square).  
More interestingly, the explanatory variable FEE now seems to have a more significant impact, 
and in the positive direction.  In other words, once we control for firm-specific and time fixed 
effects, there is some evidence (albeit admittedly rather weak) that fund fees are positively 
related to a tendency of the fund to depart farther from the mean.  Perhaps there is a deeper 
relationship between fees and fund performance in which funds that charge higher fees behave 
more independently than funds that do not (apart from firm-specific effects). 
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VI. Fund Performance 
Methodology 
In general, our performance analysis focuses on comparing our subject group of eleven core 
funds' performance to the NCREIF Property Index (NPI) as a benchmark.  In particular, we 
examine the differences between the funds' mean total gross and net returns each year and the 
NPI over time. 
Investment managers are often compared both to their peer universe and to a passive 
index that is broadly representative of his or her asset class.  The general consensus is that a 
comparison to a passive index is better in principal, since in the public securities markets, 
passive indices are replicable by both the manager and the client, and the investor can choose to 
buy the index as opposed to hiring the manager.15 
However, “buying the index” is not possible in the real estate industry.  Real estate 
portfolio managers can only buy assets that are for sale, and can generally only buy all or nothing 
with respect to a particular asset.  It would be rare for more than one manager to be able to invest 
in the same asset at the same time or to buy a partial interest16.  Also, real estate transaction costs 
are high, necessitating longer holding periods.  Perhaps the most important difference between 
direct real estate investment versus securities fund management, however, is that the real estate 
investment manager is responsible for the operational management of the asset he or she selects. 
The result is that there does not exist in the direct private real estate asset class the same 
kind of passive index or passive investment funds as are common in securities investments, and a 
peer universe index such as the NPI is therefore considered quite acceptable as a relevant 
benchmark for appropriate style investment managers, in particular, core funds serving 
institutional clients (such as our sample of 11 funds).  Using the NPI as the "benchmark" for 
defining our measure of fund performance also makes sense: i) because the properties that 
comprise the index are similar in location, type and quality to those held by core funds, and ii) 
because the funds themselves often directly compare their performance to the NPI in both 
offering memoranda and in reports to their investors. 
                                                 
15 D. Geltner and N. Miller, Commercial Real Estate Analysis and Investments, (Ohio: South-Western Publishing, 
2001), p.729 
16 other than owning a joint venture interest with an operating partner 
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Nevertheless, the differences between private real estate investing and securities 
investing described above make asset selection performance more complex in the real estate 
industry.  This has implications that need to be considered in making comparisons to a peer 
group index like the NPI, for example, to what degree selection performance effects are due to 
finding “under-priced” assets (as is the case in securities markets) versus more property 
operational level skills such as deal execution and property operational management ability.17 
As previously stated, comparisons of gross-of-fees (hereafter, simply “gross”) and net-of-
fees (hereafter, “net”) annual fund returns to the NPI are often made by the core fund industry. 
However, since every fund in our study contains a component of cash and debt in addition to its 
real estate assets, the effect of these two components must be removed in order to make an 
“apples to apples” comparison to the NPI, which is a pure property level index (with no debt or 
cash).  To do this, we first compute a de-levered return to real estate for each fund each year, 
referred to as r(RE), and then define a measure of the property level  performance of each fund 
"i" during each year "t" relative to the NPI in that year, labeled P(i,t). 
De-Levered Fund Performance Relative to the NPI, or P(i,t) 
Fund returns for each year are de-levered using a weighted average cost of capital (WACC) 
model, quantifying cash returns each year as the T-bill yield, and debt returns as the Baa-rated 
corporate bond average yield to maturity.  So, for any given fund in any given year: 
 
(RE/A)r(RE) + (C/A)r(C) = (D/A)r(D) + (E/A)r(E), 
 
where: 
(RE/A) = real estate investments as a percentage of a fund's total assets;  
(C/A) = cash holdings as a percentage of a fund's total assets;  
(D/A) = leverage ratio or debt outstanding as percentage of fund's total assets;  
(E/A) = 1 - (D/A) = equity as a residual percentage of a fund's total assets (Assets = Liabilities + 
Equity);  
r(RE) = total return to a funds' real estate investments (unlevered);  
r(C) = total return to cash (assumed equal to T-Bill yield);  
                                                 
17 D. Geltner and N. Miller, Commercial Real Estate Analysis and Investments, p.722 
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r(D) = total return to the fund's debt (assumed equal to corporate Baa-rated yield to maturity) 
r(E) = total return to the fund's equity (i.e., the gross-of-fees return reported by the fund to its 
investors); 
 
and where: 
Real Estate + Cash = Total Assets = A = D + E = Total Liabilities + Owners' Equity. 
Solving the above equation for r(RE), we get: 
 
r(RE) = [(D/A)r(D) + (E/A)r(E) - (C/A)r(C)] / (RE/A) 
= (D/RE)r(D) + (E/RE)r(E) - (C/RE)r(C). 
 
This de-levered r(RE) measure (with the cash return component also removed) can now be 
directly compared to the NCREIF Property Index total return, which represents a return to 
unlevered property.  In addition to comparing de-levered returns with the NPI, however, we 
compare r(RE) to r(E).  This difference tells us the effect of core funds’ leverage and cash 
holding strategy. We can examine these performance differentials both for the core funds as a 
group over time (averaging across funds within each year), and across individual funds 
(averaging across time for the available history of each fund). 
 As noted, the difference between our delevered r(RE) performance measure and the NPI 
each period is our measure of property level relative performance, P(i,t): 
 
P(i,t) = r(RE,i,t) - NPI(t), 
 
where: 
r(RE,i,t) = fund i's total unlevered return to real estate in year t (adjusted for cash), and 
NPI(t) = the NPI total return in year t. 
 
We begin our P(i,t) comparisons with a scatter-plot across years, similar to the deviations 
scatterplot used to describe herd behavior, where the vertical axis is P(i,t), the horizontal axis is 
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years, and each fund has a point in each year.18  We then examine the funds’ mean P(i,t) across 
time and the individual mean P(i,t) achieved by each fund. 
The Components of P(i,t):  Selection and Strategy 
To obtain greater insight into the structure of fund performance differentials vis a vis NCREIF, it 
is useful to attribute total de-levered return performance differential into two additive 
components that we will label "Selection" (SEL) and "Strategy" (STR), such that: 
 
P(i,t) = SEL(i,t) + STR(i,t). 
 
First, we construct for each fund (each year) its "alter-ego", labeled A(i,t). The alter-ego of fund 
"i" is created using fund i's allocation among property sectors, but with the NPI's total return 
performance within each property sector for each year “t”.  The alter-ego return will then be 
simulated each year, again using a WACC model: 
 
A(i,t) = SUM(w(i,j,t)*NPI(j,t)), 
 
where: 
w(i,j,t) = the weight of fund i in asset class j in year t, 
NPI(j,t) = the NPI return to asset class j in year t,  
 
and where the summation is across asset classes j = office, industrial, residential, retail, hotels, 
and other, and the sum (over j) across all the w(i,j,t) weights is one: SUM(w(i,j,t)) = 1, for every 
i and t. 
 
As a result, the alter-ego fund represents what each fund's total return performance would have 
been (each year, gross of fees) if it had achieved the same property returns within each property 
sector as the NCREIF Index. The alter-ego thus mimics the fund except for the fund's property 
                                                 
18 The difference between our Graph 4 here in the performance analysis and our previous Graph 3 in the herding 
behavior section is that here the returns are property level (adjusted for leverage and cash, as noted above), and the 
performance indicated here is relative to the NPI benchmark, rather than relative to the mean performance of just the 
11 core funds in our study.  
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selection performance relative to NCREIF. The alter-ego has fund i's allocation among property 
types, but NCREIF's return performance within each sector.19 This is A(i,t). Now we define:20 
 
SEL(i,t) = r(RE,i,t) - A(i,t); 
 
STR(i,t) = A(i,t) - NPI(t). 
 
Defining our previous total return performance measure based on gross-of-fees total return, we 
now have: 
 
P(i,t)  =  SEL(i,t) + STR(i,t)  =  r(RE,i,t) - A(i,t) + A(i,t) - NPI(t)  =  r(RE,i,t) - NPI(i,t). 
 
As noted, the SEL(i,t) component represents fund i's selection performance, the component of its 
gross-of-fees performance (in year t, relative to the NPI benchmark) that is due to its ability to 
pick (and manage and harvest) individual properties within each sector that the fund may or may 
not choose to operate in. This is the classical "bottom-up" source of real estate fund investment 
performance; the largely decentralized ability to find good property deals and execute them and 
manage them well at the property level. 
The STR(i,t) component represents fund i's "strategy" performance, the component of its 
gross-of-fees performance (in year t, relative to the NPI benchmark) that is due to its fund-level 
strategic policy choice of how to allocate real estate investments across the property market 
segments.  This is the classical "top-down" source of real estate fund investment performance; 
the largely centralized ability to conduct macro-level property market research and make 
successful fund-level strategic and tactical decisions about what property sectors to invest in, and 
when. 
                                                 
19 To be strictly correct, therefore, we must acknowledge that A(i,t) depends not only on the difference between fund 
i’s versus NCREIF’s property-level performance within each sector, but also (by the weights used) on the difference 
between fund i’s and NCREIF’s sector allocation weights (the w(i,j,t) values in the equation). Thus, our STR(i,t) 
measure is, strictly speaking, a combination of property selection and sector allocation effects. However, this is a 
measure of sector strategy (or “allocation”) effect often used in the industry, and has the advantage of combining 
with our SEL(i,t) measure to add up exactly to the total property level performance differential P(i,t) (avoiding any 
“interaction effect”). (See Geltner & Miller pp.726-727.) 
20 Note that STR(i,t) is what is often termed the fund’s “Allocation Effect”, the measure that is (somewhat 
confusingly for us here) labeled “As” in Geltner-Miller. 
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Having constructed two variables that break out the nature of core fund performance into 
these two components, we examine some summary and descriptive analysis of how the funds 
have performed over time within each of these two components of performance. 
Structural Analysis of Funds’ Relative Performance 
Finally, using pooled (time series/cross-sectional) data, we run regression analyses (regressing 
across both "i" and "t") to explore hypotheses about the determinants and correlates of P(i,t) and 
each of its two components, SEL and STR, as with the earlier analysis of herding behavior.  
Results and Analysis 
Leveraged vs. Unleveraged Returns 
Comparing both total gross and net mean returns each year to the NPI, it appears that the group 
of core funds effectively mirrors the NCREIF index with a couple of exceptions: i) during the 
down-market of the early 90’s, funds fared better than the index, and ii) fund performance lagged 
the index in time, but not in ultimate return, during the high-growth period of 1994 to 1998. 
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Graph 6:  Average Annual r(E) 
After de-levering the returns and adjusting for cash to produce a return to real estate that is more 
directly comparable to the NPI, for each fund each year, the relationships remain largely 
unchanged, with only minor differences in returns beginning to appear in 1998, due primarily to 
the negligible use of leverage prior to that time. 
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Graph 7:  Average Annual r(RE) 
Debt as a percentage of fund assets has risen dramatically since 1998, increasing from 9.4% to 
23.0% by the end of 2004.  This change in financial policy has resulted in higher risk for 
investors, but even with historically low interest rates and rapidly rising real estate values, 
produced very little additional return, as seen in Graph 8. 
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Graph 8:  Leverage Increases Over Time With Little Effect on Return 
This raises the question of whether core funds should use leverage at all, given that: i) return 
spreads between debt and real estate have historically been tight, and ii) investors can create 
leveraged portfolios on their own.  In the past twenty years, the difference in the mean levered 
and unlevered return for our group of funds has been positive only six times, with the spread in 
returns ranging from approximately -1% to 1%. 
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With the nine funds in our study that have a track record of more than three years, the 
mean spread between levered and unlevered returns for the individual funds ranges from -.4% to 
.6%.  Given that the average fund size in 2004 was nearly $3.3 billion, it seems unlikely that 
fund managers need to use debt to fund acquisitions, but are instead using leverage to enhance 
returns to equity with little success.21 
Fund Returns vs. the NCREIF Property Index 
Next, as noted, we subtracted the NPI return from each fund’s r(RE) each year to generate a 
performance measure referred to as P(i,t).  In any given year, almost all of the funds fall within a 
range of +/-5% of the NPI return for that year.  
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Graph 9:  Scatterplot of P(i,t) Over Time Showing Dispersion22 
Turning to Graph 10, averaging P(i,t) across years, it appears that core fund returns as compared 
to the NPI are negatively correlated; funds outperform the NPI in bad years and perform 
relatively poorly in good years.  The group performed exceptionally well in 1992, with returns 
outpacing the NPI by 7.6%.  However, returns relative to the NPI drop off significantly after 
1994; the mean return has not exceeded the index by more than .7% since that time.  This 
decrease in the dispersion of returns over time may indicate a maturation of the market for 
institutional quality assets. 
                                                 
21 Another possibility for the growing use of leverage, at least in part, may be an increase in the number of joint 
ventures with partners who are not tax-exempt and use debt to increase after-tax returns.  However, it is impossible 
to tell from the data collected what the magnitude of this effect may be, if any. 
22 As opposed to the scatterplots for herd behavior which illustrate return deviation from the mean return in a given 
year, this plot shows fund performance relative to the NPI. 
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Graph 10:  Negative Correlation Between Gross P(i,t) and the NPI 
It is possible that this negative correlation exists, at least in part, due to differences in the nature 
of appraised values of assets held by core funds and the properties that compose the NCREIF 
index.  In fact, in the early 1990’s, one of the subject funds conducted an independent 
investigation to determine if appraised values were being systematically over-stated in response 
to allegations that fund managers were placing undue pressure on appraisers. 
If fund asset values were indeed overstated relative to assets in the index, it would 
explain both the over-performance in 1992 and 1993 and the lag in return relative to the index 
from 1994 to 1998.  Properties that weren’t written-down as significantly in a falling market 
would likely be written-up more slowly as market values recover.  However, since it is 
impossible to know for certain if there is or has been differential treatment of assets during the 
appraisal process within our subject group of funds, we assume for the purposes of our study that 
all assets are appraised similarly. 
Although most funds marginally outperform the NPI on average, over time, on a gross 
basis, the average fees charged by the fund (as measured by the difference between the gross and 
net returns) are greater than the amount of excess return, resulting in a net return that falls below 
the benchmark.  For funds in our subject group with a track record of three years or more, the 
average difference between the net return and the NPI over the study period ranged from -.2% to 
-1.8%. 
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Graph 11:  Average Fee and average Gross P(i) over each fund’s available history 
This shortfall in net returns relative to the benchmark is not entirely unexpected (Lin and Yung 
(2004) found that real estate mutual fund managers do not produce enough return to pay for their 
expenses) and is not meant to be an indictment of the core fund industry.  Since the NPI is not an 
index that investors can buy and sell, such as the S&P 500 or the Russell 2000, these funds 
provide institutional investors with the valuable service of assembling a well diversified portfolio 
that can be invested in to obtain (something close to) the NPI return; a service that investors 
should expect to pay for.  The question for investors then becomes which manager or managers 
can most effectively reproduce the results of the NPI with the lowest tracking risk (least 
leverage) and lowest fee expenses. 
With this in mind, the next part of our analysis suggests that, while the need for skilled 
management teams to effectively execute the acquisition, management and disposition functions 
necessary to maintain an active portfolio is indisputable, there is some question about how much 
value has apparently been added by macro-level research and financial policy decisions. 
Component Analysis of P(i,t):  SEL and STR 
As noted, to better understand the nature of the difference between the funds’ unlevered returns 
to real estate and the NPI, we conducted a performance attribution analysis, parsing P(i,t) into 
two parts:  i) property selection, SEL(i,t), and ii) allocation strategy among property types, 
STR(i,t).   
Only four of the eleven funds were able to produce a positive result for both average SEL 
and STR.  Six of the funds produced positive returns in one component that were offset by 
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negative returns in the other, and one fund produced negative returns in both components.  A 
negative correlation between selection and strategy returns is also observed in the results of our 
regression analyses, which will be discussed later. 
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Graph 12:  Average SEL and STR by Fund 
Examining average SEL and STR across funds over time in Graph 13, we discover that in years 
where the group of funds either outperformed or underperformed the NPI significantly, the 
difference was almost solely attributable to property selection within a sector, rather than to a 
difference in sector allocations.  This finding stands in contrast with Gallo, Lockwood and 
Rutherford’s (2000) conclusion that allocation among asset classes was responsible for the 
superior performance of REIT mutual funds relative to the Wilshire Real Estate Index from 1991 
to 1997.  These results are not necessarily contradictory, however, due to the very different 
nature of investing in public companies that own real estate versus direct property investment, 
and the use of different benchmark indexes. 
The positive selection component returns exhibited prior to 1994 may suggest a more 
inefficient market existed during that period that allowed managers to buy bargains; however, 
since core funds were buying little (if anything) through the lean years of 1991 to 1993, it is 
likely that some portion of that return differential is attributable to existing portfolios of high-
quality, core assets outperforming their peers during a market downturn.23 
It is also interesting to note that property selection, while creating significant value for 
investors prior to 1994, has been negative or neutral ever since.  This would seem to contradict 
                                                 
23 The nature of this over-performance (at least in the early ‘90s) may again be due to the appraisal issue discussed 
earlier, but it is impossible to tell from the data collected.  
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the findings of Damodaran and Liu (1993) and Kallberg, Liu and Trzcinka (2000), who 
concluded that investment managers in real estate can produce positive abnormal returns because 
of superior skills and information about investment targets (although, again, those studies were 
of REIT mutual funds). 
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Graph 13:  Average SEL and STR by Year 
When comparing average SEL and STR across funds (as shown in Graph 12) and across time (as 
shown in Graph 13), one should note the difference in the scale of the y-axis.  The effect of the 
comparatively large positive selection return variances in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s is 
diminished when eleven subsequent years of neutral or negative selection returns are averaged 
in.  As a result, the scale of the y-axis in Graph 12 is compressed to a range of only -1.5% to 2%, 
and the relatively small strategy components in Graph 13 appear to make up a larger component 
of total P(i,t) than one might expect after looking at the breakdown of the two components over 
time. Also, it is important to recognize that the results by funds shown in Graph 12 refer to only 
to the available history for each fund, and so the sample of time covered differs across funds. 
Similarly, the results shown by year in Graph 13 refer only to the funds in existence in each year, 
and so the sample of funds included differs across years. 
Structural Analysis of Relative Performance 
To dig deeper than the aggregate level analysis reported above, we used regression analysis to 
explore relative performance at the disaggregate level, that is, where the observations in the data 
are individual fund performance differentials in each year.  We regress P(i,t) and its component 
 38
parts, SEL(i,t) and STR(i,t) onto a group of structural variables that characterize the funds and/or 
other possible determinants or correlates of fund performance.   
Overall Return Relative to the Index, or P(i,t) 
The initial model for gross P(i,t), a so-called “kitchen sink” regression that includes all of the 
possible “explanatory” variables in the equation, explained approximately 27.5% of the factors 
affecting return relative to the index.  The equation for the model is as follows: 
 
P(i,t) = α + ß1logSIZE + ß2AGE + ß3FEE + ß4HIRF + ß5LEVG + ß6DWNMKT + 
ß7NTRLMKT + ß8P(i,t-1) + ß9GRO + ß10INVSIZE 
 
where: 
logSIZE = the natural log of the size of the fund (Gross Asset Value, or GAV) as of year-end.  
The log of GAV was used to change the linear relationship of the dependent and independent 
variable, allowing for a diminishing effect on return as size increased. 
AGE = number of years since the inception of the fund.  In the absence of information about 
particular fund managers’ expertise and tenure, we use the age of the fund (and to a certain 
extent, a fund’s fee) as a proxy for “institutional wisdom”.  It is plausible that funds with a longer 
track record have accumulated some expertise in successfully acquiring, managing and disposing 
of positive-NPV assets.  
FEE = the difference between a fund’s gross and net return.  Funds that charge higher fees may 
devote more resources to research or hire more experienced managers, and consequently produce 
higher returns. 
HIRF= a Hirfendahl index was calculated for each observation (i,t) as a measure of 
diversification.  While this measure will not differentiate a fund that over-weights office from 
another which may over-weight retail, it does give an indication of how evenly distributed a 
fund’s assets are across sectors.24  We expect funds with a higher index to be positively 
                                                 
24 A Hirfendahl index is calculated by squaring the percentage of assets in each sector and adding the results 
together, producing a result in our study of between .1667 and 1.  For example, a fund that invested 16.67% of its 
GAV in each of the six sectors (office, industrial, retail, apartment, hotel and other) would be perfectly diversified 
with an index of .1667 (1/n sectors).  A fund that was invested solely in office, on the other hand, would have an 
index of 1. 
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correlated with performance, assuming that managers are making a sector bet based superior 
market knowledge or asset management skill in a given property type. 
LEVG = percentage debt calculated at year-end.25  If it were not for the relationship between 
debt and performance discussed earlier in this study, we would expect a positive correlation 
between the two.  It is plausible that managers who employ higher levels of debt do so because 
they are attempting to increase returns to equity from assets they believe will produce positive 
leverage.  
DWNMKT = dummy variable to indicate a year in which the NPI showed a negative return 
NTRLMKT = dummy variable to indicate a year in which the NPI was flat26 
P(i,t-1) = last year’s unlevered return to real estate relative to the NPI.  Including last year’s 
performance measure in the regression allows us to test for persistence in the short-term. 
GRO = growth in fund assets over the past three years.  Growth in GAV could be an indication 
that investors believe a fund will outperform its peers or the NPI, evidenced by the “votes” they 
cast with their investment dollars. 
INVSIZE = the average size of a fund’s individual investments27 
                                                 
25 (GAV-NAV)/GAV 
26 By creating dummy variables for both down and neutral markets, we are allowing the effect of an up market to be 
reflected in the coefficient.  When the neutral market variable is replaced with an up market dummy, we find that 
UPMKT is negatively correlated with fund performance (although it is not significant at the 95% level) and 
DOWNMKT, while still positively correlated, is no longer statistically significant. 
27 GAV/Number of Investments 
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Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.524473543
R Square 0.275072497
Adjusted R Square 0.198764339
Standard Error 0.028838678
Observations 106  
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value
Intercept -0.003750351 0.034878094 -0.107527 0.914597
logSIZE -0.015058318 0.009784493 -1.538998 0.127129
AGE 0.000510363 0.000499379 1.021995 0.309379
FEE 2.503203004 1.612751715 1.552132 0.123956
HIRF 0.019161665 0.042648031 0.449298 0.65424
LEVG -0.042517908 0.035949238 -1.182721 0.239871
DWNMKT 0.01981451 0.007261121 2.72885 0.007573
NTRLMKT 0.009365014 0.007433067 1.259912 0.210787
P(i,t-1) 0.380537994 0.09095944 4.183601 6.4E-05
GRO -0.00243263 0.004280417 -0.568316 0.571161
INVSIZE 0.000291696 0.000226379 1.288525 0.200693  
Table 6:  Initial Regression Results for P(i,t) 
The constant, the age of a fund, a fund’s Hirfendahl index (measure of diversification among 
different property sectors), leverage, a neutral market, growth in gross asset value during the past 
three years, and average investment size produced the lowest t-statistics, indicating a lack of 
causality or correlation, and were removed before running a second, more parsimonious 
regression with the remaining variables that seem most significant.  The fact that these variables 
had little explanatory power is an interesting observation by itself; however, in that the expected 
relationships discussed above either do not exist or have only a minor effect on performance. 
Our second analysis still explained 23.3% of the variation in disaggregate level fund 
return relative to the NPI, using only four variables. 
 
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.483197354
R Square 0.233479683
Adjusted R Square 0.201131046
Standard Error 0.028618813
Observations 106  
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value
logSIZE -0.00619286 0.003365502 -1.840099823 0.068661
FEE 1.406174123 0.911559397 1.542602849 0.126024
DWNMKT 0.016806029 0.005771967 2.911664026 0.004416
P(i,t-1) 0.371695841 0.086742313 4.285057976 4.15E-05   
Table 7:  Parsimonious Regression Results for P(i,t) 
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Both DWNMKT and P(i,t-1) were statistically significant at the 95% confidence level and both 
showed positive coefficients, suggesting higher returns relative to the index if either: i) it was a 
down year for the index, or ii) the fund performed well the previous year relative to the NPI.  
Although not significant at the 95% confidence level, a fund’s fee was positively correlated with 
gross P(i,t), while its size showed negative correlation. 
One reason for the positive correlation between fee and gross return may be the incentive 
compensation structure common to most core funds.  In addition to a base fee, which is usually 
calculated as a percentage of assets under management, managers are often paid an incentive 
bonus once certain base return hurdles are met.  This fee structure is designed to motivate 
managers to produce higher returns, and will necessarily result in higher fees paid to managers in 
years when their fund performs well.  It is possible that managers who produce superior returns 
are able to charge higher fees, or that those with an incentive fee structure work harder, and 
therefore achieve better results.  However, keep in mind that our regression model only tells us 
that a fund’s fee and its gross return are positively correlated; it cannot tell us whether the higher 
fee resulted in the higher return (i.e., direction of causality is not implied by the empirical 
correlation that is found). 
It is also worth noting that when the same regression is run using net P(i,t), the t-stat on 
FEE drops from 1.54 to 1.04, and the coefficient falls from 1.41 to .94.  The fact that a fund’s fee 
is less significant in explaining differences in net returns suggests that the value of any increase 
in returns is captured to a significant degree by the fund’s management, and is not passed on to 
the investor.  This finding is supported by Lin and Yung (2004) and Myer, Webb and He (1997), 
who observed that real estate mutual fund performance on a net basis was unrelated to the fund’s 
fee or expense ratio.  On the other hand, our finding that the coefficient for net-of-fee 
performance still remains positive (even if smaller and less significant) does suggest that some 
benefit of the superior gross-of-fee performance related to higher fees may indeed be passed on 
to investors. 
Contrary to the conclusion of Lin and Yung, we find that larger funds were negatively 
correlated with relative performance in our regression analysis.  As a fund’s assets under 
management grow, it may become more difficult for managers to effectively identify and place 
sufficient capital in positive or zero NPV investments that will perform as well as the index.  
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This, combined with the negative return correlation with leverage demonstrated in the initial 
regression, further questions the value of core funds use of debt financing. 
To examine the magnitude or importance of each of these variables, we calculated a 
mean impact on return (the variable’s coefficient multiplied by the mean of that variable) to 
quantify the magnitude of the effect, and multiplied each variable’s coefficient by its standard 
deviation to measure the range of each variable’s expected effect on P(i,t) within our data (here 
labeled “Dispersion”).   
Magnitude Dispersion
Variable (Const. * Avg.) (Const. * Std. Dev.) Low High
logSIZE -1.91% 0.33% -2.24% -1.58%
FEE 1.59% 0.35% 1.24% 1.95%
DWNMKT 0.55% 0.79% -0.24% 1.35%
P(i,t-1) 0.15% 1.20% -1.05% 1.34%
Expected Range of Effect
 
Table 8:  Measures of Magnitude and Dispersion for Selected Coefficients 
In other words, the first row and first column in Table 3 suggests that the effect of the (log) size 
of the average sized fund on the fund’s net-of-fee relative performance is negative 1.91%. That 
is, the fund’s performance is 1.91% below what it would be for a hypothetical “zero-sized” fund. 
Based on the 1-standard-deviation range in the (log) size of funds across the (pooled) database, 
the effect of size in the actual data causes net-of-fee relative returns to range between 1.58% and 
2.24% below what they would be if there were no size effect.  Similar reasoning is applied to 
each of the other three significant determinants or correlates of fund performance indicated in the 
table.  Given that the average net P(i,t) across funds is -.6%, each of these variables could have a 
significant effect on return relative to the index. 
Investment Selection  
After searching for correlates of overall performance relative to the NPI, we ran regressions for 
both investment selection and strategy.  The model for investment selection explained 
approximately 24.4% of the factors affecting performance.  The equation for the model is as 
follows: 
 
SEL(i,t) = α + ß1logSIZE + ß2AGE + ß3FEE + ß4HIRF + ß5LEVG + ß6DWNMKT + 
ß7NTRLMKT + ß8SEL(i,t-1) + ß9STR(i,t) + ß10GRO + ß11INVSIZE 
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where all of the variables have the same definitions as before, except we now include: 
SEL(i,t-1) = last year’s selection return component, and  
STR(i,t) = this year’s strategy return component. 
 
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.49396547
R Square 0.244001886
Adjusted R Square 0.155534021
Standard Error 0.028751668
Observations 106  
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value
Intercept -0.012423936 0.036002571 -0.345085 0.730802
logSIZE -0.012839173 0.010320713 -1.24402 0.216585
AGE 0.00050246 0.00050012 1.00468 0.31763
FEE 2.398548573 1.607607449 1.491999 0.139048
HIRF 0.029643739 0.042982216 0.689675 0.492098
LEVG -0.037277616 0.035956106 -1.036753 0.30251
DWNMKT 0.019917577 0.007329198 2.717566 0.00783
NTRLMKT 0.007762248 0.007583068 1.023629 0.308638
SEL(i,t-1) 0.360690813 0.092927989 3.881401 0.000193
STR(i,t) -0.555120352 0.301744231 -1.839705 0.068968
GRO -0.001703071 0.004329227 -0.393389 0.694923
INVSIZE 0.00025494 0.000233666 1.09104 0.278044  
Table 9:  Regression Results for SEL 
Only the one-year lagged variable, SEL(i,t-1), and DWNMKT were statistically significant at the 
95% confidence level, and both showed positive coefficients. 
Other dependent variables were significant, but not at the 95% confidence level.  Larger 
funds were negatively correlated with selection return, as was a fund’s strategy performance in 
that year.  A fund’s fee was again positively correlated with selection return. 
In both this regression and the next, selection and strategy returns are negatively 
correlated, suggesting that managers perform well at either buying, managing and selling assets 
or allocating funds across property types, but not both.  Looking back to Graph 8, we see that, 
over time, skillful property selection has produced returns significantly above the index far more 
often than superior asset allocation strategies.  If we assume for a minute that the institutional 
property market has not become more efficient, and consequently, that positive property 
selection returns are still possible, is there a case to be made for hiring managers specializing in a 
single property type who should theoretically possess an investment selection advantage over 
managers who must divide their attention among all asset classes? 
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Investment Strategy 
The model for investment strategy explained approximately 24.3% of the factors affecting 
performance.  The equation for the model is as follows: 
 
STR(i,t) = α + ß1logSIZE + ß2AGE + ß3FEE + ß4DWNMKT + ß5NTRLMKT + ß6SEL(i,t) + 
ß7STR(i,t-1) + ß8GRO + ß9INVSIZE 
 
where all of the variables have the same definitions as before, except we now include: 
SEL(i,t) = this year’s selection return component, and  
STR(i,t-1) = last year’s strategy return component. 
 
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.492853128
R Square 0.242904206
Adjusted R Square 0.171926475
Standard Error 0.009683169
Observations 106  
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value
Intercept 0.023409601 0.008057865 2.905186 0.004556
logSIZE -0.009348013 0.003209061 -2.913005 0.004453
AGE 0.000117389 0.000166051 0.706949 0.481311
FEE -0.153124837 0.446598642 -0.342869 0.732447
DWNMKT 0.002143391 0.002505805 0.85537 0.394476
NTRLMKT 0.003856471 0.002475702 1.557728 0.122588
SEL(i,t) -0.037468505 0.031820806 -1.177484 0.241913
STR(i,t-1) 0.205886488 0.100109798 2.056607 0.042437
GRO 0.000879115 0.001504746 0.584228 0.560437
INVSIZE 0.000152444 6.73543E-05 2.26331 0.025869  
Table 10:  Regression Results for STR 
In this regression, logSIZE, STR(i,t-1) and INVSIZE were all statistically significant at the 95% 
confidence level.  Both STR(i,t-1) and INVSIZE showed positive coefficients, but, as in the 
other regressions, logSIZE was negatively correlated with strategy return.  It is interesting that 
the average investment size was significant with regard to allocation strategy return, but not to 
selection or overall P(i,t).  However, with such a small coefficient, the mean effect on return is 
only four basis points. 
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Other dependent variables were significant, but not at the 95% confidence level.  Selection 
return in the current year was negatively correlated with a fund’s strategy return component, 
while a sideways year for the index showed positive correlation. 
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VII. Conclusion 
The results of our study suggest that herd behavior, where managers base investment decisions 
on the collective actions of the market rather than their individual beliefs, may or may not be 
present in the core fund industry, depending on how we define ‘herding’.  After performing an 
aggregate analysis of performance dispersion across all funds and within each year, we found 
that herd behavior tended to be somewhat correlated with the NCREIF return.  Through the 
disaggregate analysis (the individual fund returns relative to the mean return each year), the 
funds were more tightly bunched in the 3 and 5-year return deviations.  Without an industry-
specific herd behavior percentage measure, the average mean absolute deviation (MAD) across 
all funds and time of 2.8%, may or may not indicate herd behavior. 
We also performed a regression analysis to gain an understanding of the determinates or 
correlates of herd behavior.  Although the set of structural explanatory variables tested does not 
explain much of the variation in herd behavior (R-square), the analysis does find some predictive 
power in a few of the explanatory variables.  Herding appears to be positively related to fund 
size, negatively related to fund leverage and exhibits positive momentum or persistence from the 
previous year.  Adding “fixed effects” of time and fund to the regression model greatly improves 
the fit of the regression (R-square).  There is some evidence that fund fees are positively related 
to a tendency of the fund to depart farther from the mean. 
As for our performance analysis, by comparing returns to equity with delevered returns to 
real estate, we find that although fund leverage has increased significantly over time, from 9.4% 
in 1998 to 23.0% by the end of 2004, the use of debt has produced little or no additional return to 
investors.  The average spread between levered and unlevered returns for the nine funds in our 
study that have a track record of more than three years ranges from -.4% to .6%. 
We also conclude that, across funds, average unlevered net returns for core funds fall 
short of the NPI index.  For funds in our subject group with a track record of three years or more, 
the average difference between the net return and the NPI over the study period ranged from -
.2% to -1.8%.  This shortfall is consistent with studies of real estate mutual fund returns and is to 
be expected when comparing net returns with an index that does not reflect any cost of 
management. 
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Across time, there is a negative correlation between the performance of the index and 
fund performance relative to the index, with the largest departure from the NPI occurring during 
the down market of the early 90’s.  Returns relative to the NPI decrease significantly after 1994; 
the mean return has not exceeded the index by more than .7% since that time. 
Portfolio-level attribution analysis reveals that property selection returns have produced 
the greatest amount of return deviation from the NPI over time, and that across funds, selection 
and strategy returns are negatively correlated.  Four of eleven funds in our study were able to 
create value relative to the index through both successful property selection and allocation 
strategy.  Six produced positive returns in one component that were offset by negative returns in 
the other, and one produced negative returns in both components.  These results raise some 
question about how much value can be added through macro-level research and financial policy 
decisions. 
Regression analysis suggests that there is persistence in the short term for P(i,t) and its 
components.  A fund’s fee is positively correlated with gross returns; however at least part of the 
benefit of the higher return is captured at the fund level, as the correlation weakens when the 
same regressions are run using net returns.  Larger funds are negatively correlated with 
performance in each of our regressions, suggesting that effectively placing capital in positive 
NPV investments becomes more difficult as fund size increases.  
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VIII. Appendix 
 
Regression Output: Herd Behavior Deviation on fund size, age, leverage, fee, NCREIF 
markets, and the one-yr lag of fund deviation (1985-2004) –across time and funds 
 
Independent Variable: Fund specific GAV 
Independent Variable: Fund Age 
Independent Variable: Fund Leverage 
Independent Variable: Fund Fee (Gross minus Net Return) 
Independent Variable: NCREIF up market 
Independent Variable: NCREIF down market 
Independent Variable: 1-yr lag of herd deviation 
Dependent Variable: Fund Deviation from the Average 1985-2004 
 
D(i,t) = -0.000049 - .00000027SIZE + .000025Age + .00485Leverage + .0307Fee + .000416NCREIFupmkt + 
.00031NCREIFdwnmkt + .2008D(i,t-1) 
 
SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.356142021
R Square 0.126837139
Adjusted R Square 0.075474618
Standard Error 0.002740477
Observations 127
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 7 0.000129823 1.85461E-05 2.46944925 0.021125428
Residual 119 0.000893715 7.51021E-06
Total 126 0.001023538
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept -4.90382E-05 0.001293581 -0.03790892 0.96982383 -0.002610457 0.002512381 -0.002610457 0.002512381
Fund Size (GAV) -2.72006E-07 1.52653E-07 -1.78186113 0.07732242 -5.74274E-07 3.02617E-08 -5.74274E-07 3.02617E-08
Fund Age 2.46567E-05 3.02753E-05 0.814416596 0.41703313 -3.52914E-05 8.46047E-05 -3.52914E-05 8.46047E-05
Fund Leverage 0.00485159 0.002736687 1.772796758 0.078821 -0.000567324 0.010270503 -0.000567324 0.010270503
Fee 0.030705983 0.101465131 0.302625966 0.76270327 -0.170205108 0.231617075 -0.170205108 0.231617075
NCREIF up 0.000415751 0.000562688 0.738866934 0.46144265 -0.000698426 0.001529929 -0.000698426 0.001529929
NCREIF falling 0.000309003 0.0002609 1.184375314 0.23862471 -0.000207605 0.000825611 -0.000207605 0.000825611
Di, t-1 var 0.200803248 0.091784433 2.187770215 0.03064076 0.019060906 0.382545589 0.019060906 0.382545589  
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Regression Output: Herd Behavior Deviation on fund size, leverage, and the one-yr lag of 
fund deviation (1985-2004) –across time and funds 
 
Independent Variable: Fund specific SIZE 
Independent Variable: Fund Leverage 
Independent Variable: 1-yr lag of herd deviation 
Dependent Variable: Fund Deviation from the Average 1985-2004 
 
D(i,t) = -0.000992 - .00000024SIZE + .00444Leverage + .2236D(i,t-1) 
 
SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.332902488
R Square 0.110824066
Adjusted R Square 0.089136848
Standard Error 0.002720153
Observations 127
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 3 0.000113433 3.78109E-05 5.110109869 0.002291862
Residual 123 0.000910105 7.39923E-06
Total 126 0.001023538
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept 0.000992092 0.000433489 2.288618948 0.023807695 0.000134026 0.001850157 0.000134026 0.001850157
Fund Size (GAV) -2.39251E-07 1.36876E-07 -1.747939996 0.082969728 -5.10188E-07 3.16866E-08 -5.10188E-07 3.16866E-08
Fund Leverage 0.004449131 0.002108157 2.110436338 0.036846341 0.000276164 0.008622099 0.000276164 0.008622099
Di, t-1 var 0.223605094 0.089069357 2.510460411 0.013355282 0.047297766 0.399912423 0.047297766 0.399912423
 50
Regression Output: Herd Behavior Deviation on Fund size, age, leverage, fee, NCREIF 
markets, the one-yr lag of fund deviation (1985-2004), firm and time fixed effects –across 
time and funds 
D(i,t) =.00000015SIZE - .000034Age + .00217Leverage + .2755Fee - .002338NCREIFupmkt -
.00035NCREIFdwnmkt + .1303D(i,t-1) 
Source SS df MS Number of obs = 127
F( 37,    90) = 2.89
Model 0.0006979 37 1.886E-05 Prob > F = 0
Residual 0.0005881 90 6.53E-06 R-squared = 0.5427
Adj R-squared = 0.3547
Total 0.001286 127 1.013E-05 Root MSE = 0.00256
ditsqrd Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
fundsizegav 1.52E-07 3.62E-07 0.42 0.676 -5.67E-07 8.71E-07
fundage -3.39E-05 0.000108 -0.31 0.754 -0.0002484 0.0001806
fundleverage 0.0021678 0.0048232 0.45 0.654 -0.0074143 0.0117498
fee 0.2755184 0.1783305 1.54 0.126 -0.0787663 0.6298031
ncreifup -0.002338 0.0027455 -0.85 0.397 -0.0077929 0.003116
ncreiffall~g -0.000347 0.0004106 -0.85 0.4 -0.001163 0.0004686
dit1var 0.1303059 0.1061333 1.23 0.223 -0.0805464 0.3411581
americarei~i -0.000282 0.0025509 -0.11 0.912 -0.0053494 0.004786
americanst~d (dropped)
guggenheim~s -0.000704 0.0039692 -0.18 0.86 -0.008589 0.0071821
lionproper~d -0.000503 0.002695 -0.19 0.852 -0.005857 0.0048513
mept -0.000953 0.0013386 -0.71 0.479 -0.0036121 0.0017068
primeprope~y (dropped)
prisai -0.000182 0.0011598 -0.16 0.876 -0.0024862 0.002122
prisaii 0.0017054 0.00123 1.39 0.169 -0.0007383 0.0041491
specialsit~d -0.00318 0.0031144 -1.02 0.31 -0.0093667 0.0030078
strategicp~d -0.002323 0.003743 -0.62 0.536 -0.0097592 0.005113
towerfund -6.69E-05 0.0011774 -0.06 0.955 -0.002406 0.0022721
usincomegr~h 0.0008165 0.0036053 0.23 0.821 -0.0063461 0.0079792
usproperty~t -0.000207 0.0012296 -0.17 0.867 -0.0026494 0.0022364
y2004 0.0000938 0.0021817 0.04 0.966 -0.0042405 0.0044281
y2003 0.0009396 0.0022961 0.41 0.683 -0.0036221 0.0055013
y2002 -0.002563 0.003144 -0.82 0.417 -0.008809 0.0036833
y2001 -0.00197 0.0031874 -0.62 0.538 -0.0083028 0.0043621
y2000 -0.001976 0.0031187 -0.63 0.528 -0.0081722 0.0042194
y1999 -0.001782 0.0029583 -0.6 0.549 -0.0076587 0.0040956
y1998 0.0020126 0.0032462 0.62 0.537 -0.0044366 0.0084617
y1997 0.0032011 0.0020972 1.53 0.13 -0.0009654 0.0073676
y1996 -0.00045 0.0020612 -0.22 0.828 -0.0045453 0.0036447
y1995 0.001975 0.0020289 0.97 0.333 -0.0020558 0.0060057
y1994 -0.000178 0.0020911 -0.09 0.932 -0.0043325 0.0039762
y1993 0.0001747 0.002119 0.08 0.934 -0.004035 0.0043844
y1992 0.003596 0.0028192 1.28 0.205 -0.0020047 0.0091967
y1991 -0.002172 0.0027527 -0.79 0.432 -0.0076408 0.0032966
y1990 -0.001017 0.0027686 -0.37 0.714 -0.0065169 0.0044837
y1989 0.0005747 0.0020922 0.27 0.784 -0.0035818 0.0047313
y1988 (dropped)
y1987 -0.001251 0.0027401 -0.46 0.649 -0.0066949 0.0041924
y1986 -0.001515 0.002714 -0.56 0.578 -0.0069066 0.0038771
y1985 -0.00216 0.002705 -0.8 0.427 -0.0075338 0.003214
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Regression Output: Herd Behavior Deviation on fund size, age, leverage, fee, NCREIF 
markets, the one-yr lag of fund deviation (1985-2004), firm fixed effects –across time and 
funds 
D(i,t) = - .00000013SIZE - .000028Age + .00147Leverage + .2875Fee + .000411NCREIFupmkt + 
.00042NCREIFdwnmkt + .0720D(i,t-1) 
Source SS df MS Number of obs = 127
F( 20,   107) = 3.42
Model 0.0005013 20 2.506E-05 Prob > F = 0
Residual 0.0007847 107 7.33E-06 R-squared = 0.3898
Adj R-squared = 0.2757
Total 0.001286 127 1.013E-05 Root MSE = 0.00271
ditsqrd Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
fundsizegav -1.31E-07 3.05E-07 -0.43 0.668 -7.35E-07 4.73E-07
fundage -2.79E-05 0.0000708 -0.39 0.694 -0.0001683 0.0001124
fundleverage 0.0013891 0.0047716 0.29 0.772 -0.00807 0.0108483
fee 0.2875926 0.1777721 1.62 0.109 -0.0648198 0.640005
ncreifup 0.0004112 0.0005578 0.74 0.463 -0.0006945 0.001517
ncreiffall~g 0.0004164 0.0002699 1.54 0.126 -0.0001185 0.0009514
dit1var 0.0720821 0.0970701 0.74 0.459 -0.1203481 0.2645123
americarei~i -0.002136 0.0020325 -1.05 0.296 -0.0061647 0.0018937
americanst~d -0.002675 0.0032316 -0.83 0.41 -0.0090808 0.0037319
guggenheim~s -0.002618 0.0042708 -0.61 0.541 -0.0110841 0.0058488
lionproper~d -0.002659 0.0020871 -1.27 0.205 -0.0067964 0.0014784
mept -0.002008 0.0023989 -0.84 0.404 -0.0067636 0.0027476
primeprope~y -0.000942 0.0025916 -0.36 0.717 -0.0060797 0.0041955
prisai -0.001135 0.0024502 -0.46 0.644 -0.0059923 0.0037221
prisaii 0.0005638 0.0020783 0.27 0.787 -0.0035561 0.0046838
specialsit~d -0.00478 0.0031626 -1.51 0.134 -0.0110494 0.0014896
strategicp~d -0.00255 0.0028195 -0.9 0.368 -0.0081394 0.0030394
towerfund -0.001966 0.002084 -0.94 0.348 -0.0060968 0.0021657
usincomegr~h -0.000967 0.0034392 -0.28 0.779 -0.007785 0.0058507
usproperty~t -0.002096 0.0020223 -1.04 0.302 -0.0061046 0.0019132  
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Regression Output: Herd Behavior Deviation on fund size, age, leverage, fee, NCREIF 
markets, the one-yr lag of fund deviation (1985-2004), time fixed effects –across time and 
funds 
D(i,t) =-000000173SIZE +.000018Age + .00490Leverage + .0980Fee - .001107NCREIFupmkt -
.00040NCREIFdwnmkt + .2572D(i,t-1) 
Source SS df MS Number of obs = 127
F( 26,   101) = 3.7
Model 0.0006276 26 2.414E-05 Prob > F = 0
Residual 0.0006584 101 6.52E-06 R-squared = 0.488
Adj R-squared = 0.3562
Total 0.001286 127 1.013E-05 Root MSE = 0.00255
ditsqrd Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
fundsizegav -1.74E-07 1.53E-07 -1.14 0.257 -4.77E-07 1.29E-07
fundage 0.0000182 0.0000292 0.62 0.536 -0.0000398 0.0000762
fundleverage 0.0049037 0.0034233 1.43 0.155 -0.0018872 0.0116947
fee 0.0980096 0.1134024 0.86 0.389 -0.1269502 0.3229695
ncreifup -0.001107 0.001905 -0.58 0.562 -0.0048861 0.0026719
ncreiffall~g -0.000398 0.0003921 -1.02 0.312 -0.001176 0.0003796
dit1var 0.2572132 0.097004 2.65 0.009 0.0647834 0.449643
y2004 0.0000855 0.0017277 0.05 0.961 -0.0033418 0.0035128
y2003 0.0007063 0.0017619 0.4 0.689 -0.0027889 0.0042015
y2002 -0.001668 0.0014786 -1.13 0.262 -0.0046016 0.0012648
y2001 -0.00116 0.0015804 -0.73 0.465 -0.0042951 0.0019749
y2000 -0.001091 0.00152 -0.72 0.474 -0.0041065 0.0019241
y1999 -0.001412 0.0015157 -0.93 0.354 -0.0044187 0.0015946
y1998 0.0025436 0.0021121 1.2 0.231 -0.0016463 0.0067335
y1997 0.0030539 0.0018337 1.67 0.099 -0.0005837 0.0066915
y1996 -0.000906 0.0018304 -0.49 0.622 -0.0045368 0.0027254
y1995 0.001795 0.0018279 0.98 0.328 -0.0018311 0.005421
y1994 -0.00027 0.0019642 -0.14 0.891 -0.0041668 0.0036261
y1993 -0.00051 0.0020149 -0.25 0.801 -0.0045072 0.0034868
y1992 0.0049431 0.001791 2.76 0.007 0.0013903 0.0084959
y1991 -0.00084 0.0017841 -0.47 0.639 -0.004379 0.0026993
y1990 0.0006575 0.0018244 0.36 0.719 -0.0029616 0.0042767
y1989 0.0006409 0.0020862 0.31 0.759 -0.0034976 0.0047795
y1988 (dropped)
y1987 0.0001483 0.0019652 0.08 0.94 -0.0037501 0.0040467
y1986 0.0000513 0.0019498 0.03 0.979 -0.0038165 0.0039192
y1985 -0.000466 0.0019528 -0.24 0.812 -0.0043402 0.003407
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Regression Output: Performance Analysis- P(i,t) 
 
Dependent Variable: Annual Gross Return Relative to the NPI, or P(i,t) 
Independent Variable: Log of Fund GAV 
Independent Variable: Fund Age 
Independent Variable: Fund Fee (Gross - Net Return) 
Independent Variable: Hirfendahl Index 
Independent Variable: Fund Leverage 
Independent Variable: NPI Down Market Dummy 
Independent Variable: NPI Neutral Market Dummy 
Independent Variable: 1-Year Lag of Performance 
Independent Variable: Growth in GAV Over Past 3 Years 
Independent Variable: Average Investment Size 
 
P(i,t) = -0.00375 - 0.01506logSIZE + 0.00005AGE + 2.50320FEE + 0.01916HIRF - 0.04252LVG + 
0.01981DWNMKT + 0.00937NTRLMKT + 0.38054P(i,t-1) – 0.00243GRO + 0.00029INVSIZE 
 
SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.524473543
R Square 0.275072497
Adjusted R Square 0.198764339
Standard Error 0.028838678
Observations 106
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 10 0.029979674 0.002998 3.6047587 0.000432477
Residual 95 0.079008591 0.000832
Total 105 0.108988265
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept -0.003750351 0.034878094 -0.107527 0.9145974 -0.072992072 0.065491371 -0.072992072 0.065491371
logSIZE -0.015058318 0.009784493 -1.538998 0.127129 -0.034482978 0.004366343 -0.034482978 0.004366343
AGE 0.000510363 0.000499379 1.021995 0.3093787 -0.000481029 0.001501756 -0.000481029 0.001501756
FEE 2.503203004 1.612751715 1.552132 0.1239559 -0.698511666 5.704917673 -0.698511666 5.704917673
HIRF 0.019161665 0.042648031 0.449298 0.6542402 -0.065505321 0.10382865 -0.065505321 0.10382865
LEVG -0.042517908 0.035949238 -1.182721 0.2398714 -0.113886118 0.028850303 -0.113886118 0.028850303
DWNMKT 0.01981451 0.007261121 2.72885 0.0075729 0.005399372 0.034229648 0.005399372 0.034229648
NTRLMKT 0.009365014 0.007433067 1.259912 0.2107872 -0.00539148 0.024121507 -0.00539148 0.024121507
P(i,t-1) 0.380537994 0.09095944 4.183601 6.397E-05 0.199960803 0.561115185 0.199960803 0.561115185
GRO -0.00243263 0.004280417 -0.568316 0.5711613 -0.010930327 0.006065067 -0.010930327 0.006065067
INVSIZE 0.000291696 0.000226379 1.288525 0.2006925 -0.000157724 0.000741115 -0.000157724 0.000741115  
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Regression Output: Performance Analysis- P(i,t) 
 
Dependent Variable: Annual Gross Return Relative to the NPI, or P(i,t) 
Independent Variable: Log of Fund GAV 
Independent Variable: Fund Fee (Gross - Net Return) 
Independent Variable: NPI Down Market Dummy 
Independent Variable: 1-Year Lag of Performance 
 
P(i,t) = -0.00619logSIZE + 1.40617FEE + 0.01680DWNMKT + 0.37170P(i,t-1) 
 
SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.483197354
R Square 0.233479683
Adjusted R Square 0.201131046
Standard Error 0.028618813
Observations 106
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 4 0.025446545 0.006361636 7.76722 1.68935E-05
Residual 102 0.083541719 0.000819036
Total 106 0.108988265
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
logSIZE -0.00619286 0.003365502 -1.840099823 0.068661 -0.012868315 0.000482594 -0.012868315 0.000482594
FEE 1.406174123 0.911559397 1.542602849 0.126024 -0.401898706 3.214246953 -0.401898706 3.214246953
DWNMKT 0.016806029 0.005771967 2.911664026 0.004416 0.005357365 0.028254693 0.005357365 0.028254693
P(i,t-1) 0.371695841 0.086742313 4.285057976 4.15E-05 0.199642961 0.543748721 0.199642961 0.543748721  
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Regression Output: Performance Analysis- Selection Return 
 
Dependent Variable: Annual Selection Component of P(i,t) 
Independent Variable: Log of Fund GAV 
Independent Variable: Fund Age 
Independent Variable: Fund Fee (Gross - Net Return) 
Independent Variable: Hirfendahl Index 
Independent Variable: Fund Leverage 
Independent Variable: NPI Down Market Dummy 
Independent Variable: NPI Neutral Market Dummy 
Independent Variable: 1-Year Lag of Selection Performance 
Independent Variable: Current Year Strategy Performance 
Independent Variable: Growth in GAV Over Past 3 Years 
Independent Variable: Average Investment Size 
 
SEL(i,t) = -0.01242 - 0.01284logSIZE + 0.00005AGE + 2.39850FEE + 0.02964HIRF - 0.03728LVG + 
0.01992DWNMKT + 0.00776NTRLMKT + 0.36070SEL(i,t-1) – 0.55512STR(i,t) – 0.00170GRO + 
0.00025INVSIZE 
 
SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.49396547
R Square 0.244001886
Adjusted R Square 0.155534021
Standard Error 0.028751668
Observations 106
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 11 0.025079935 0.00228 2.758085 0.003847324
Residual 94 0.077705889 0.000827
Total 105 0.102785824
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept -0.012423936 0.036002571 -0.345085 0.730802 -0.083907848 0.059059975 -0.083907848 0.059059975
logSIZE -0.012839173 0.010320713 -1.24402 0.216585 -0.03333118 0.007652833 -0.03333118 0.007652833
AGE 0.00050246 0.00050012 1.00468 0.31763 -0.000490539 0.001495459 -0.000490539 0.001495459
FEE 2.398548573 1.607607449 1.491999 0.139048 -0.793392078 5.590489223 -0.793392078 5.590489223
HIRF 0.029643739 0.042982216 0.689675 0.492098 -0.055698416 0.114985894 -0.055698416 0.114985894
LEVG -0.037277616 0.035956106 -1.036753 0.30251 -0.108669271 0.034114039 -0.108669271 0.034114039
DWNMKT 0.019917577 0.007329198 2.717566 0.00783 0.005365291 0.034469863 0.005365291 0.034469863
NTRLMKT 0.007762248 0.007583068 1.023629 0.308638 -0.007294103 0.022818599 -0.007294103 0.022818599
SEL(i,t-1) 0.360690813 0.092927989 3.881401 0.000193 0.176180207 0.545201419 0.176180207 0.545201419
STR(i,t) -0.555120352 0.301744231 -1.839705 0.068968 -1.15424029 0.043999586 -1.15424029 0.043999586
GRO -0.001703071 0.004329227 -0.393389 0.694923 -0.010298848 0.006892705 -0.010298848 0.006892705
INVSIZE 0.00025494 0.000233666 1.09104 0.278044 -0.000209011 0.00071889 -0.000209011 0.00071889  
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Regression Output: Performance Analysis- Strategy Return 
 
Dependent Variable: Annual Strategy Component of P(i,t) 
Independent Variable: Log of Fund GAV 
Independent Variable: Fund Age 
Independent Variable: Fund Fee (Gross - Net Return) 
Independent Variable: NPI Down Market Dummy 
Independent Variable: NPI Neutral Market Dummy 
Independent Variable: Current Year Selection Performance 
Independent Variable: 1-Year Lag of Strategy Performance 
Independent Variable: Growth in GAV Over Past 3 Years 
Independent Variable: Average Investment Size 
 
STR(i,t) = 0.02340 - 0.00934logSIZE + 0.00012AGE - 0.15312FEE + 0.00214DWNMKT + 0.00386NTRLMKT 
- 0.37469SEL(i,t) + 0.20589STR(i,t-1) + 0.00088GRO + 0.00015INVSIZE 
 
SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.492853128
R Square 0.242904206
Adjusted R Square 0.171926475
Standard Error 0.009683169
Observations 106
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 9 0.002887955 0.000321 3.422259 0.001088654
Residual 96 0.00900132 9.38E-05
Total 105 0.011889275
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept 0.023409601 0.008057865 2.905186 0.004556 0.007414852 0.039404349 0.007414852 0.039404349
logSIZE -0.009348013 0.003209061 -2.913005 0.004453 -0.015717953 -0.002978072 -0.015717953 -0.002978072
AGE 0.000117389 0.000166051 0.706949 0.481311 -0.000212219 0.000446998 -0.000212219 0.000446998
FEE -0.153124837 0.446598642 -0.342869 0.732447 -1.039616812 0.733367137 -1.039616812 0.733367137
DWNMKT 0.002143391 0.002505805 0.85537 0.394476 -0.002830596 0.007117378 -0.002830596 0.007117378
NTRLMKT 0.003856471 0.002475702 1.557728 0.122588 -0.001057762 0.008770704 -0.001057762 0.008770704
SEL(i,t) -0.037468505 0.031820806 -1.177484 0.241913 -0.100632354 0.025695344 -0.100632354 0.025695344
STR(i,t-1) 0.205886488 0.100109798 2.056607 0.042437 0.007169957 0.404603018 0.007169957 0.404603018
GRO 0.000879115 0.001504746 0.584228 0.560437 -0.002107785 0.003866015 -0.002107785 0.003866015
INVSIZE 0.000152444 6.73543E-05 2.26331 0.025869 1.87463E-05 0.000286141 1.87463E-05 0.000286141  
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